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GRAIN AND THE RAILROADS 
The decade of the 70's saw farm policy changes that resulted in an era 
of unprecedented growth and expansion in the grain industry. Grain exports 
became an important element in U.S. foreign policy, beginning with the sign-
ing of the two-year trade agreement with Russia in the fall of 1972. The 
Russian agreement was indicative of a major policy shift from agricultural 
production restrictions to aggressive export sales promotion. With certain 
perturbations, as in 1975 when domestic reserves became dangerously low and 
in 1979 during the Russian embargo, U.S. grain exports have moved steadily 
upward throughout the 70's. This has caused a virtual revolution in grain 
transportation. 
The railroad industry has evolved from their chaotic handling of the 
harvests of 1973-74 when 15,000 to 20,000 open coal cars were drafted to 
handle the upsurge in grain demand, to a much more efficient operation in 
the 1980 season when the rail carriers transported 5 billion bushels of grain 
with no major or prolonged car shortages. 
A principal contributor to the increase in rail carrier efficiency during 
the 70's was the transformation of the "grain fleet" to "jumbo" covered hopper 
cars. The jumbo cars were capable of carrying 3,400 bushels of corn compared 
to 2,000 bushels in the outmoded 40-foot boxcar. This transformation occurred 
at an average annual rate of 12,300 covered hopper cars until, by 1980, 90 
percent of all rail-hauled grain moved in hopper cars. 
The changing grain fleet quickly outgrew many branch and main lines with 
old light-weight rail not up to the 100 pounds per yard standard considered 
minimal for rail operations today. Shippers found it necessary to upgrade 
siding and grain transfer facilities during an extensive period of alteration 
and remodeling. 
The decade of the 70's saw the advent of another grain transportation 
development, the "unit train" grain shipment. Substantial cost and rate re-
ductions were realized from unit train shipments of covered hopper cars, 
expecially when compared to single boxcar shipments. This was due to a 60 
percent increase in grain capacity per car and reduced loading, unloading, 
in-transit, and switching time. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 afforded rail 
carriers greater opportunities to transmit these savings to the shipper 
through rate reductions and to experiment with and adjust charges and services. 
The result was an unmistakable message that the railroads are in the business 
of moving large volumes over long distances. This message has been clearest 
to communities, grain elevators, and farmers served by low-density branch 
and main lines throughout the Upper Midwest who have discovered that rail 
carriers intend to move quickly to exercise their Staggers Act freedoms to 
divest themselves of rail lines that remain or become unprofitable. 
The combined efficiencies of covered hopper car and unit-train shipment 
of grain opened the door for Upper Midwest participation in the rapidly de-
veloping export outlets on the West Coast. U.S. West Coast grain volume 
increased approximately fivefold during the 1971-1980 period, with Japan 
receiving a relatively constant percentage. Though wheat exports from West 
Coast terminals tripled during the 1971-1980 period, the biggest contributor 
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to West Coast grain volume increases has been corn. Corn shipments from 
these ports remained negligible until 1977, but increased to 39 percent of 
all West Coast grain volume in the next four years. The rapid development 
of the corn export market through West Coast outlets, as shown in Table 1, 
is part of a worldwide trend from food grains, such as wheat, to feed grains 
and oilseeds, such as corn and soybeans. This has had a significant impact 
on Minnesota agriculture. 
Table 1. Pacific Exports of All Commodities from Puget Sound, 
Columbia River and California (000 Metric Tons) 
1971 1980 
Japan 1,999 (40%) 10,073 (42%) 
Korea 930 (19%) 3,605 (15%) 
China 0 1,865 ( 8%) 
Other Asia & 
Oceania 1,302 (26%) 5,659 (24%) 
Europe 437 ( 9%) 344 ( 1%) 
Latin America 319 ( 6%) 1,600 ( 7%) 
Africa 0 811 ( 3%) 
TOTAL 4,987 23,957 
Wheat 85% 52% 
Corn 9% 39% 
Barley 12% 2% 
Soybeans 2% 0% 
Sorghum 1% 7% 
SOURCE: United States Department of Agriculture, "Grain and 
Feed Market News." 
THE MINNESOTA CONNECTION 
Minnesota is locationally disadvantaged with respect to the major U.S. 
grain export markets. The four principal Minnesota grain arteries are: 
1) lake shipments from Duluth/Superior, 2) barge shipments from Mississippi 
River terminals to the Gulf, 3) direct rail shipments from country elevators 
to Gulf export terminals, and 4) direct rail shipments to the West Coast, 
specifically to Pacific Northwest export terminals. These outlets provide the 
flexibility necessary for participation in the constantly changing internation-
al grain markets. 
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International supply and demand, exchange rates, international and dom-
estic politics, and the grain transportation system interact to cause export 
offers that attract Minnesota grain. At some point along the flow of agri-
cultural commodities, a country elevator or subterminal manager must obtain 
the necessary information to make a decision as to where, when, in what quan-
tity, and by which mode he will sell and ship the agricultural commodities 
which he has assembled. The decision is highly sensitive to prices, elevator 
location, transportation carriers providing service, and the rail shipping 
capacity of the elevator. It is the profit-maximizing decision that the 
elevator makes to sell grain in a particular export market that determines 
the draw of that export outlet. Throughout much of the 70's, truck-barge 
movements to Gulf ports through Minnesota river terminals, and truck or rail 
to Duluth terminals followed by lake shipment have been the profit-maximizing 
decisions for elevator managers in Minnesota and portions of North and South 
Dakota. Recently, direct-rail shipments from country and subterminal eleva-
tors have become important, particularly as increasing quantities of Minnesota 
corn move to Pacific Northwest export terminals. 
The major causal factor for the increased Minnesota participation in West 
Ceast corn exports was the publication by the railroads serving Minnesota's 
cash corn producing regions of low unit-train grain rates to Pacific North-
west destinations. The most recent survey data indicates that the Pacific 
Northwest draws corn in Minnesota from an area south of U.S. Highway 10 and 
up to three or four counties from Minnesota's western border. Figure 1 shows 
Minnesota Crop Reporting District 7's corn shipments. These estimates were 
obtained from the University of Minnesota's commodity flow surveys for 1977 
and 1979. 
The 1977 corn crop followed two poor harvests and was an inventory re-
building year with below average out-of-state corn sales. The 1979 crop 
generated corn shipments from southwestern Minnesota of 66,413,200 bushels, 
which was 142 percent above the 1977 level. Market disturbances in 1979 
included the Duluth Grain Millers strike and rail disruptions due to the 
Rock Island and Milwaukee Road bankruptcies. Figure 1 illustrates the 
following: 
1. Despite strike problems, Duluth/Superior became an important 
outlet for the relatively large southwestern Minnesota corn 
crop in 1979. 
2. Long-haul trucking from southwestern Minnesota bo Duluth/Superior 
dropped to zero in 1979. 
3. Rail to the Twin Cities, and the Twin Cities share of the south-
western Minnesota corn market dropped substantially in 1979. 
Trucking, however, increased 74 percent. 
4. Direct Gulf rail shipments expanded more than threefold, partly 
due to a much larger cash grain crop, obtaining 31.9 percent 
of the southwestern Minnesota cash corn market. 
5. The Pacific Northwest market opened for southwestern Minnesota 
in 1978 at single-car rates, accounting for 13.4 percent of 
the cash corn market by 1979. 
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THE EXPORT MARKET CHOICE 
What are the factors that influence the country elevator or subterminal 
manager's shipment choice? At the simplest level, it is the combination of 
export price offer and market access that yields the best net price (export 
offer minus the transportation cost of moving grain to the export point) that 
should provide the highest revenue available to that shipper. This is the 
underlying basis of our complex marketing system. However, in order for a 
shipper to qualify for the most advantageous rail rates and, therefore, the 
best net price, it is sometimes necessary to commit to a prescribed number of 
shipments ranging from 1 to 25 trips in a given period of time. Also, fail-
ures in the transportation system from rail car shortages to labor strikes 
introduce unpredictable limitations on access to markets. Finally, hedged 
positions, differential grain handling charges, embargoes, inventory costs, 
and revenue turn-around times can cloud the relatively clear market signal 
of the best net price to the extent that they are not reflected in the net 
price computation. Despite the disturbances noted above, commodity price, 
net of transportation cost, predicts the elevator manager's decision quite 
closely, especially over the longer term. 
The following discussion examines corn prices, transportation rates, 
and a computed net corn price in harvest and non-harvest time periods from 
1979 through 1981 for a selected subterminal in southwestern Minnesota. 
EXPORT TERMINAL CORN PRICES AND THE 
SOUTHWESTERN MINNESOTA SPOT PRICE 
Figure 2 illustrates corn prices at five locations from 1979 to 1981. 
The non-harvest time period of 1980 has been split between June and July, 
which was when multiple-car rail rates to the Pacific Northwest were first 
published. The spread between the southwestern Minnesota spot price (the 
price paid by the subterminal) for corn and the export offer at a particu-
lar destination for prompt delivery is the local basis due to location. In 
simpler terms, it is the price spread at a point in time between southwestern 
Minnesota and one of the other four destinations presented in Figure 2 when 
transportation cost is not considered. The local basis due to location for 
shippers in southwestern Minnesota desiring to sell corn to Gulf terminals 
was strong during the harvest of 1979 ($0.80/bu.), but dropped to a rela-
tively constant $0.62 per bushel for the remaining time periods. The local 
basis due to location for Pacific Northwest oriented shippers has fluctuated 
around $1.00 per bushel--strongest during the harvest of 1980 ($1.10/bu.) 
and weakest during the harvest of 1981 ($0.88/bu.). One factor contributing 
to the 1981 weakness was the relative strength of the U.S. dollar. The 
price difference between Pacific Northwest and Gulf ports was small during 
the 1979 harvest ($0.19/bu.). It expanded to $0.48 per bushel dt1ring the 
1980 harvest, and as illustrated in Figure 2, \vas S0.2b pet- bushd during 
the harvest of 1981. 
The Duluth/Superior, Twin Cities, and southwestern Minnesota spot prices 
for corn tend to move together over time as depicted in Figure 2. The loca-
tional basis was slightly stronger during the summer of 1980 for both Duluth/ 
Superior and Twin Cities destinations. The difference between Duluth/Superior 
and Twin Cities corn prices was small in the 1979 h<Hvest (~O.Oli/bu.) and 
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again during the non-harvest time period of 1981 ($0.02/bu.). Duluth/Superior 
prices are sensitive to foreign sales, particularly to Russia, while Twin 
Cities corn prices are ties to Gulf export offers by barge rates. This rela-
tionship is discussed in more detail later in the net corn price section of 
this publication. 
RAIL AND MOTOR CARRIER RATES 
Table 2 presents motor carrier and rail rates from October 1979 through 
December 1981. During this time period, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) approved general rail rate increases totaling 40 percent. However, 
rail carriers published multiple-car rates that gave high volume shippers 
lower costs to Twin Cities and Pacific Northwest destinations in late 1981 
than in 1979. High volume rates published to Gulf terminals and Duluth 
were increased only slightly. This type of rate competition with other 
railroads is characteristic of the post-Staggers Act railroad industry. 
Briefly, the Staggers Act of 1980 reduced the common carrier obligation 
of the railroads. This obligation historically required the provision of 
service on a non-discriminatory basis at a reasonable cost. Enforcement of 
this obligation over the years had served to hinder the railroad's ability 
to earn a reasonable rate of return. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 provided: 
1. Greater rate flexibility. 
2. Service contracts between shipper and carrier. These contracts 
may specify shipment volume, number of shipments, and a variety 
of performance factors and incentives for both parties. 
3. Faster and easier abandonment of unprofitable branch and main 
lines. 
4. Surcharges to shippers on low-density lines. 
Another rate factor is the size of shipment. Though rail and motor car-
rier rates have been computed from a single origin point with a fixed shipping 
capacity, rates for facilities with different shipping capacities will be 
compared. 
Due to what some have termed the 1981 "rate war" between rail carriers 
providing service from Minnesota's cash corn producing region, high volume 
rail rates in late 1981 were as much as 9 cents per bushel lower than any rate 
available in early 1981. This reduction occurred while Interstate Commerce 
Commission approved Rail Cost Recovery Increases "could" have increased rates 
by 14 percent (13¢/bu.). Small shippers, however, were increasingly dis-
advantaged as many of the ICC approved rate increases were implemented in 
full for single-car movements (Table 2). Figure 3 illustrates the growing 
difference between large and small shippers in cents per bushel. This rate 
disparity is frequently sufficient enough to force small southwestern Minne-
sota shippers to truck to the Twin Cities (Savage) where the corn will be 
barged to the Gulf. Fortunately for the small shippers, truck rates remained 
relatively stable throughout the 1979 to 1981 time fra!lle, increasing 19.3 
Table 2. Notor Carrier and Rail Rates From a Selected Southwest Minnesota Origin to Principal Destinations (¢/bu.) 4 
DULUTH THIN CITIESl 
Single Single 
Time Period Dates Truck Rail 26-Car 54-Car 75-Car Truck Rail 26-Car 54-Car 75-Car 
---
Harvest 1979 10/1/79 to 41.4 42.6 31.4 30.0 27.2 20.7 25.8 20.2 19.3 NA 
12/31/79 
Non-Harvest 1980 Period 1 41.4 43.5 32.1 30.7 27.8 20.7 26.4 20.7 19.7 NA 
Non-Harvest 1980 Period 2 43.1 49.3 34.7 33.0 29.7 22.4 30.0 22.7 21.8 NA 
Harvest 1980 10/1/80 to 45.62 51.8 36.4 34.7 31.4 23.02 31.4 24.1 23.0 21.8 
12/31/80 
Non-Harvest 1981 1/1/81 to 43.1 55.4 35.3 33.0 30.2 22.4 33.6 21.8 20.7 18.5 
9/30/81 
Harvest 1981 10/1/81 to 51.5 56.6 37.0 34.2 31.4 25.2 34.2 18.5 16.8 15.1 
12/31/81 
GULF 3 PNH3 
Best Best 
Comb. Comb. 
Single Single 
Time Period Dates Rail < 26-Car 26-Car 54-Car 75-Car Rail ~26-Car 26-Car 54-Car 75-Car 
--- ---
---
Harvest 1979 10/1/79 to 91.0 NA 66.9 61.9 58.5 176.4 97.4 NA NA NA 
12/31/79 
Non-Harvest 1980 Period 1 93.0 NA 68.4 63.3 59.8 180.3 113.1 NA NA NA 
Non-Harvest 1980 Period 2 105.6 NA 77.6 71.7 67.8 204.4 113.1 98.6 94.4 89.9 
Harvest 1980 10/1/80 to 110.9 NA 81.5 75.3 71.1 210.6 118.7 103.6 99.1 94.4 
12/31/80 
Non-Harvest 1981 1/1/81 to 118.7 NA 81.2 75.6 71.7 230.2 126.6 99.1 93.5 89.0 
9/30/81 
Harvest 1981 10/1/81 to 120.4 NA 77.8 73.4 67.8 233.0 128.8 95.2 87.9 85.1 
12L:HL81 
1 Savage was used as the Tt~in Cities truck destin~tion. 
2 Hinimum Ninnesota Public Service rate plus 10%. 
3 Multiple-car rates are for the maximum "number of movements." 
4 Rates are published on a ¢/cwt. For accuracy at the ¢/bu. level, no rounding has been done to the cent or half cent. basis. 
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percent to Duluth and 12.5 percent to the Twin Cities in December 1981. 
Truck rates were less than single-car rail rates to Duluth/Superior and the 
Twin Cities throughout the 1979-1981 time period. 
The most significant rate development for southwestern Minnesota shippers 
occurred in July of 1980. Then 26, 54, and 75 car rail rates were published 
to Pacific Northwest destinations. The rate for the largest volumes was 
23.2 cents per bushel lower than any West Coast rate previously available. 
The combined impact of a strong Pacific locational basis (Figure 1) and the 
new unit-train rail rates to the West had a predictable effect on the de-
cisions of many subterminal managers in southwestern Minnesota. 
THE SOUTHWESTERN MINNESOTA 
NET CORN PRICE DECISION 
Net corn price is a major decision variable in corn market selection. 
Figure 4 illustrates the market strength of the four principal Minnesota ex-
port outlets for corn from 1979 through 1981. The net corn price levels in 
Figure 4 represent an average of the weekly net corn prices for each export 
destination during the time periods indicated. Shipment volumes large enough 
to get the lowest transport rates were assumed. 
Net corn prices during the harvest of 1979 were strong for Gulf shipments, 
exceeding the next best alternative (Duluth/Superior) by $0.31 per bushel for 
high volume shippers. During the January to June time period of 1980, Duluth/ 
Superior provided the strongest net corn price, exceeding the Gulf by $0.16 
per bushel. Pacific Northwest net corn prices in early 1980 were the lowest 
computed for the 1979-1981 time period. By July, Pacific Northwest corn 
prices strengthened and the multiple-car rates to the west were instituted, 
combining to increase the Pacific Northwest net corn price by $1.36 per 
bushel. This increase began an uninterrupted net corn price advantage for 
the Pacific Northwest market for elevators that could meet the high volume 
shipment requirements. This net price advantage reached $0.41 per bushel 
over the next best alternative during the harvest of 1980. 
Recently, excess grain transportation capacity has existed in the truck, 
rail, and barge modes. The impact of excess barge capacity has lowered barge 
rates from the Twin Cities to the Gulf and has caused a strengthening of the 
Twin Cities net corn price. As barge rates go lower, the direct rail net 
corn prices to Gulf outlets fall below those available by truck or rail to 
Twin Cities river terminals. The result is a net corn price advantage switch 
to the Twin Cities. This is illustrated in Figure 4 in 1981. The Twin Cities 
net corn price surpasses that available from direct rail shipments to the 
Gulf by as much as $0.12 per bushel. The Twin Cities net corn price was 
also considerably closer to the Pacific Northwest net corn price in 1981. 
Figure 5 examines the differences in net corn prices for large and 
small volume shippers from 1979 to 1981. The magnitude of the rail rate 
advantage for those who can make large volume shipments is tempered somewhat 
by the fact that small and large shippers can often choose different markets 
for their corn. There is frequently a "truck to the Twin Cities" floor on 
the net corn price differences between large and small shippers. However, 
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the net corn price advantage of the large over the small shipper has expand-
ed $0.07 per bushel since 1979. Particularly distressing for the small 
shipper is that the net price difference of the large over the small shipper 
is very strong during the harvest season when 40 percent of the corn is mar-
keted. The three harvests illustrated in Figure 5 have had large versus 
small shipper net corn price differences of $0.17, $0.23, and $0.24, re-
spectively. This is a sufficient difference to cause great concern to the 
small elevator operator. The small elevator operator in southwestern 
Minnesota has responded by: 
1. Attempting to construct subterminal or temporary facilities 
on main lines or federating with other shippers who have such 
facilities. 
2. Buying into existing subterminals on main lines. 
3. Trucking to the Twin Cities or to nearby subterminals. 
4. Phasing out cash corn operations and focusing on feed, 
fertilizer, agricultural chemicals, and farm service. 
5. Going out of business. 
Figure 6 illustrates subterminal development in Minnesota in 1974 and 
1981. Interviews with elevator managers confirm that many of the new facili-
ties in southwestern Minnesota have been "justified" solely on expectations 
of grain shipments to Pacific Northwest destinations. Subterminal construction 
activity during the summer of 1981 has focused attention of the issue of eleva-
tor capacity. Of the 85 elevators in Minnesota's Crop Reporting District 7, 
the 20 largest, in terms of annual volume, handled 90 percent of the transport-
able corn surplus in 1979. The new subterminals will be in direct competition 
with existing firms that had sufficient capacity to serve the area. Indica-
tions are that a poor harvest, increased on-farm feeding, or the construction 
of processing facilities could impact marginal or locationally disadvantaged 
facilities severely. 
The trend'in modern grain marketing to regional subterminal assembly for 
high volume shipment has a double-edged impact on the agricultural community. 
The corn producer is the recipient of a better Minnesota spot price for his 
product due to improved, high volun1e access to a rapidly developing market 
in the Pacific Northwest. The small elevator and small community, on the 
other hand, experience a progressively deteriorating situation as cash grain 
volume is drawn to the regional subterminals. This draw has another impact--
that on the road system. 
Development of unit-train loading facilities and their use has had a 
mixed effect on the road and highway system. Like the old rail rate struc-
ture, the primary highways of the area are generally east-west oriented. 
Usage and wear on these primary roads increased substantially throughout the 
70's as an increasing number of heavy grain trucks hauled grain longer and 
longer distances to the lake and river terminals each year. 
Increased direct rail shipments of grain from country elevators has 
reduced the use of the primary highways. But now heavy vehicles used in 
MULTiPLE-CAR RAIL ELEVf\TORS - 1974 MULTIPLE-CAR RAIL ELEVATORS - 1981 
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grain assembly are going much longer distances ov~r rural and secondary roads 
and are increasing the wear on these roads. These secondary roads are fre-
quently not as well constructed as the primary roads which were previously 
used. 
The net effect of whether total road wear will increase or decrease has 
not yet been determined. However, there will be a transfer of the financial 
responsibility from the states to local units of government because financ-
ing the collector roads is generally a function of local government. This 
shift is only now being recognized, but will become of increasing concern 
to the local officials who are responsible for highways. 
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